Abstract. The article seeks to measure and explain provincial autonomy in Vietnam during the reform era, arguing that the absence of an effective measure of autonomy to date has limited the scope for developing an overarching theory capable of explaining autonomy across a range of settings. The article pioneers a method for measuring autonomy involving a content analysis of Vietnamese newspapers over a ten-year period, noting whenever provinces are reported for engaging in a series of carefully defined autonomous acts. Having developed the measure of autonomy, the article seeks to test four hypotheses for explaining it, namely geographical location, relations with central government, initial conditions on the eve of reform, and the dominant source of economic activity in terms of ownership. The article finds that no single factor accounts for autonomy on its own but also that there is only a weak relationship between autonomy and a province's geographical location and that provinces heavily represented in central government tend to be among the least autonomous.
Introduction
In an interview, a provincial People's Committee deputy chairman in the Mekong Delta was asked a question about the 'innovative' development strategies being attempted in nearby Binh Duong and Dong Nai provinces. Stopping the interviewee in mid-sentence, the deputy chairman, interjected: 'You misunderstand development in those provinces. Those provinces have been successful because they had mountains.' Mountains, he went on, were the key to development because they could be levelled, freeing up rocks to create roads and bridges, while less endowed provinces could not afford to invest heavily in infrastructure. Roads and bridges lowered the costs of transporting goods to Ho Chi Minh City, which attracted foreign investors. According to the official, it was only after large stocks of foreign direct investment (FDI) built up in a province that they acquired the autonomy to pursue the innovative strategies referred to above. Binh Duong and Dong Nai were economic success stories because they enjoyed a mountain premium. Meanwhile, the deputy chairman's province in the low lands of the Mekong Delta was cursed by topography. 1 In some respects, the notion of mountains as the driving force of economic development seems absurd. And yet, buried within this rather bizarre exchange is an important question. If not mountains, what factors have allowed a small set of provinces to pursue innovative approaches to economic development? Some scholars have termed this freedom to innovate de facto decentralisation or autonomy, which is the terminology adopted in this article.
2 I also use the term fence-breaking to describe acts of autonomy. Fence-breaking was classically a term used by Vietnam scholars to describe the violation of central government rules and regulations by state-owned enterprises (SOEs) during the central planning era. 3 In this article, I extend the term's usage to include provincial government activity that violated central government regulations during the post-planning period, and provincial government experimentation or innovation in situations where regulations do not exist.
Mountains aside, the deputy chairman's logic hints at two causal factors which may play a role in leading to de facto decentralisation: infrastructure, which attracts foreign investors, and FDI itself, which as the official suggested and it is argued here, strengthens the bargaining position of provincial governments. 4 Apart from infrastructure and FDI, there are a multitude of other possible explanations for de facto decentralisation in Vietnam during the reform era, some of which are explored in this article. In Vietnam studies, there is a large and growing literature addressing the issue of provincial autonomy. In fact, it has become extremely common to assert that one cannot understand Vietnam's politics and political economy without reference to it. The literature on provincial autonomy can loosely be divided into three sub-categories. One group of authors commonly directs the reader to the famous proverb, 'Phep vua thua le lang', or the 'King's law stops at the village gates', as evidence not only that this is an important phenomenon today but also that it is one which has existed throughout Vietnamese history. 5 However, in such accounts, the analysis rarely goes beyond simply asserting the existence of provincial autonomy or at most offering a description of the sources of provincial power.
A second group of scholars have studied the actions of a few cutting-edge provinces that led the way in terms of experimentation prior to the doi moi (renovation) economic reforms introduced at the Sixth Party Congress in 1986.
6 Benedict J. Tria Kerkvliet highlights the 'sneaky rice contracts' in Hai Phong and Vinh Phu in the early 1980s.
7 Gareth Porter looks at the 1980 'Long An model' of wage and price policies. 8 Phong and Beresford highlight numerous provincial experiments although they narrow their lens on Ho Chi Minh City's defiance of a central government circular prohibiting commercial use of motorcycles in 1979.
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Such work is notable for its detail and its 'thick description'. It usefully highlights the origins of more contemporary experimentation and, in some cases, uncovers the complex central-local networks that enabled such experimentation to occur. Such scholarship falls short, however, of offering a comprehensive account of the general mecha- nisms at play and hence limits predictability in other contexts. 10 For example, what is it that has allowed certain provinces to push forward with innovative economic policies, while other provinces have lagged behind, heavily dependent on central government transfers and multilateral aid? Of course, historical factors, initial conditions on the eve of reform, and personal relations between central and local actors are likely to have played a role but how much and when? Such factors, it is worth remembering, exist across time and space and yet experimentation has occurred in particular provinces at particular times. Without a standard measure of autonomy, it is very difficult to make comparisons or grant causal primacy to any particular factor. Such a measure, however, is thus far lacking in the literature on Vietnam.
A third area of the provincial autonomy literature focuses on a debate which has emerged during the reform era, namely whether Vietnam is decentralising or centralising. While intuitively the former seems more likely to be correct and hence has attracted plenty of adherents, a number of scholars have highlighted moves to recentralise power during the 1990s. Thaveeporn Vasavakul, for example, has pointed to attempts by the central government to re-centralise power through the redefinition of tasks and jurisdiction of local government.
11 Martin Gainsborough's study of Ho Chi Minh City confirms Vasavakul's position by noting the central government's efforts to rein in Ho Chi Minh City during the reform era.
12 However, as some scholars have noted, both sides of the debate may be simultaneously true.
13 Decentralisation has occurred in spite of efforts by the centre to centralise power. Moreover, when formal legislation shifted responsibilities to the sub-national level, it was often only formalising changes that had already occurred.
In this article I seek to test three of the more commonly asserted explanations for provincial autonomy or fence-breaking in the reform era in Vietnam. These are North-South differences and particularly the legacy of the South's separate development between 1954 and 10 A notable exception here is Doug Porter's careful comparisons of the impact of economic liberalisation on districts in Ba Ria-Vung Tau and Quang Nam-Da Nang. See Doug J. Porter, 'Economic Liberalisation, Marginality, and the Local State,' In Benedict J. Tria Kerkvliet and Doug J. Porter (eds.), Vietnam's Rural Transformation (Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1995 1975; the impact of initial conditions on the eve of reform; and the rise of provincial politicians to positions in central government. With respect to the latter, the argument would be that the rise of provincial politicians to the centre has given the provinces from whence they came a degree of protection or room for manoeuvre that has allowed experimentation to occur. I also seek to test a fourth, less commonly cited explanation for provincial autonomy, namely whether the extent of autonomy is influenced by the dominance of one source of economic activity (i.e., state, private or foreign) over another. Before I can test these explanations for provincial autonomy, I first need to develop a way of measuring autonomy. To do this, I conducted a content analysis of six Vietnamese daily newspapers from 1990-2000, recording every time a province was cited in connection with one of four things: firstly, engaging in fence-breaking; secondly being punished for fence-breaking; thirdly, requesting permission to engage in policy experimentation; and fourthly being granted permission to engage in experimentation.
14 All four categories were regarded as evidence of autonomous activity even though a request to experiment or the granting of such a request might simply involve formalising existing practice.
The content analysis process yielded a total of 550 articles covering fifteen different policy areas. Seven of these are discussed in the article. They are: land use rights; state housing sales; administrative policy; legal reform, micro-economic policy; trade policy; and industrial or export-processing zones. Nearly all of Vietnam's 61 provinces were cited at least once although many provinces did not receive any hits in a particular year.
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Measuring something as elusive and politically sensitive as de facto decentralisation is clearly not easy, and no approach will be entirely fool-proof. The strength of the approach adopted here is that it exploits the common practice in Vietnam whereby politicians use the state-owned media, including the press, to denounce provinces which contravene central policy and also to boast about the successes of provincial experiments purportedly sanctioned by central government. 15 Due to provincial boundary changes the number of provinces in Vietnam fluctuated during the period in which the content analysis took place. However, where possible, this has been adjusted for during the preparation of the data set. 16 The precise relationship between central government and provincial experi-There are some limitations to the approach adopted here, although where possible, I have sought to control for them. Firstly, the two largest cities of Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City tended to be cited in the press more than other provinces, simply because of their special importance to the economy as a whole. At the same time, smaller, less commercially attractive provinces tend to receive less coverage in the newspapers. However, in multivariate testing of my measure of provincial autonomy, I have sought to control for this by taking into account a province's overall contribution to national GDP (i.e., the larger a province's contribution to GDP, the more one would expect it to be cited in the press).
Secondly, it is often not clear whether a province has simply 'broken a fence' or is engaged in corruption, as is sometimes suggested in the press. The fact that factional struggles between politicians are often played out in the media increases the likelihood that corruption allegations will sometimes be politically motivated. Some so-called 'policy innovations' undoubtedly do carry personal gain for officials and their families. To address this problem, I have divided the data set into cases where officials potentially benefited monetarily from an initiative through the sale of houses, land, or imported goods, and cases where this was less likely. Cases of 'tentative' corruption account for about one-third of the entire sample of cases. When analysing the data, I used both the cumulative data set and a data set including only cases where no personal gain was likely. Results did not vary significantly, although the relationship between FDI and autonomy was strongest when cases of personal gain were dropped.
Thirdly, some scholars have noted that the central government may avoid publicly criticising a particular province for fear that drawing attention to its innovation will cause it to spread. 17 If this is the case, there is no denying that my data set simply misses such occasions as provinces must be cited to appear. This highlights the need for additional research in the form of qualitative case studies of a subset of provinces.
The article proceeds as follows. It first highlights the kind of fencebreaking activity revealed by the content analysis across the seven different policy areas selected for discussion in this article. It then sets out the overall results of the content analysis, highlighting where ments said to have official sanction, is often unclear. However, there are strong suspicions that the centre claims the experiment as its own ex post facto. 17 Gareth Porter noticed that it took years for the government to acknowledge Long An province's violation of central pricing policies. When it finally did, it trumpeted them as its own ideas. See Porter, Vietnam.
and when fence-breaking was most common. The remainder of the article is concerned with assessing the validity of the four hypotheses as explanations of provincial autonomy in Vietnam during the 1990s.
Cases of Fence-Breaking in Vietnam Land Use Rights
Provincial governments were at the forefront of attempts to create markets for land. Local level experimentation on land can be seen in several provinces in the early 1990s when increasing investor activity drove up the price of land in high FDI-recipient provinces. Investors needed land and provinces had an abundance to sell as they shifted away from a reliance on the agricultural sector. As no private market for land existed, provinces began to sell land illegally to domestic investors, who often leased it to foreigners. 18 Many provincial officials were cited in the press for violations involving land in the early 1990s. Officials in more powerful provinces generally remained in office. Smaller, less powerful officials were sometimes dismissed.
In 1993, the central government responded to violations such as these with the passage of a new Land Law. This created a market for land by allowing investors to lease land use rights certificates for long periods of time. In co-opting provincial land experiments, the central government was motivated by the opportunity to benefit from increases in provincial revenue, which would flow from the leasing or transfer of land use right certificates to private business, largely by both central and local SOEs.
Fence-breaking also occurred with provinces allowing private companies to use land use rights as collateral for bank loans from the early 1990s. Officially, this was only permitted for SOEs. The southern Ba Ria-Vung Tau province was one of the first provinces to extend this right to private firms in 1993. Initially, the province's leaders were criticised for their actions. Later, they were given central government permission to pursue an experiment in this area although this was subsequently revoked amid allegations that the practice was being abused. 19 However, in time, other provinces also started allowing private companies to use land use rights as collateral. The practice was finally enshrined in the revisions to the Land Law in 1998.
The central government also came under provincial pressure to extend a fuller range of land rights to foreigners. In 2000, the prime minister's office agreed to a request by Ho Chi Minh City People's Committee to be allowed to grant long-term land leasing and housing rights to foreigners. 20 After some debate, the approach was given the status of an official experiment that was later extended to Binh Duong and Dong Nai.
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State Housing Sales
Other provincial fence-breaking involved the sale of state-owned housing for private business and personal use. This was in clear breach of Article 6 of the Housing Law.
22 A full-scale investigation into the practice occurred in Ho Chi Minh City in the early 1990s but closed without anyone being punished formally. Nevertheless, officials in Ho Chi Minh City continued to be cited in the newspapers for violations after the investigation had been concluded. 23 
Administrative Policy
In the early 1990s Ho Chi Minh City and Binh Duong provinces took unilateral steps to try and improve local government efficiency in a policy which later became known as 'one door, one stamp'. The policy sought to simplify administrative procedures in a number of different areas, ranging from registering an enterprise to getting permission to extend one's house. At first, both Ho Chi Minh City and Binh Duong were criticised in the press for their activities. However, Ho Chi Minh City was granted official permission in 1994 to pilot the programme in a number of districts in the city. Binh Duong, by contrast, continued to operate 'one door, one stamp' without official permission. Later, the experiment was extended to the whole of Ho Chi Minh City. 25 As other provinces, including Dong Nai and Vung Tau, began to implement the 'one door, one stamp' policy in order to compete with Ho Chi Minh City and Binh Duong, the centre decided to roll out the policy nationally. The first national resolution on public administration reform was issued in May 1994. Initially, it implemented the policy rather conservatively although it was later developed more wholeheartedly.
Legal Reform
During the first half of the 1990s the government took steps to develop a civil code designed to create a legal framework suitable for a market economy. Some provincial governments can again be seen taking pioneering steps in this respect. This included moving to recognise different forms of corporate ownership before this occurred nationally and then making representations to the centre for the changes to be enshrined in law. Nine provinces were cited in the press as recognising five different types of ownership (state, non-state, collective, limited liability and joint stock), rather than the official three (state, non-state and collective).
26 These were later given official recognition in the civil code passed in 1995.
Micro-economic Reform
Micro-economic reform includes policies aimed at improving the efficiency of the private sector and creating a level playing field between state and private companies. Both northern and southern provinces have experimented with innovative policies designed to develop the private sector and create a level-playing field between state and private firms. In the first half of the 1990s, Ho Chi Minh City and other southern provinces, such as An Giang and Binh Duong, were most prominent in this area although northern provinces such as Hung Yen and Vinh Phuc became more vocal in the second half of the decade.
In 1992, Ho Chi Minh City People's Committee chairman, Nguyen Vinh Nghiep, proposed a series of reforms to prepare for a stock market for private companies. The suggestion was met with scepticism at the time in one newspaper. 27 However, experimentation in this area was critical to future moves to develop a stock market and a law to encourage domestic investment, notably by the private sector. A stock market was finally opened in Ho Chi Minh City in 2000.
In the late 1990s, provincial attempts to by-pass central government policies that favoured the state enterprises were evident from a heated exchange in the National Assembly which was reported in the press. Several northern provinces defended their use of fence-breaking polices to boost the performance of the private sector. A delegate from Bac Ninh province was especially vocal accusing the government of saying one thing and doing another: 'On the one hand, the government keeps saying it wants to promote non-state economic players,' he said, 'but on the other hand it continues to provide credit and administrative and tax favours to large and loss-making state companies.' The delegate called on the government to back up its words with action, saying that otherwise the country would not develop.
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The People's Committee in Ho Chi Minh City was the first provincial authority to call for a level playing field between state and private companies in regard to auditing procedures. In 1997, it issued a resolution stating that all companies would be held to the same auditing standards regardless of ownership type.
29 Two years later, Ho Chi Minh City requested and received permission from central government to issue procurement contracts on an experimental basis for project worth less than a stipulated amount. Prior to this, the city was criticised in the press for putting projects out to tender without central government permission.
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Trade Policy
In the early 1990s, a series of scandals rocked several southern provinces, which had contravened official trade regulations. This included Ho Chi Minh City and provinces such as Binh Duong, Can Tho, Dong Nai, Dong Thap. One common practice was for the provincial authorities to allow goods to be imported without paying duty. These could then be sold at a lower price than goods on which import duty had been paid. 31 During the 1990s, Ho Chi Minh City was cited for a variety of other trade violations as well. These ostensibly seemed to be designed to reduce the time it took for goods to clear customs. On one occasion, the city authorities were accused of clearing goods awaiting inspection by the customs department before they had been assessed for import duty.
32
In some provinces, low-level officials were punished for allegedly violating government trade policy. However, more senior provincial officials generally escaped with just a warning. 33 Where overt punishment did occur, it appears to have been in places where FDI was minimal in the early 1990s, such as coastal areas in central southern Vietnam. In some cases, provinces have pushed for import taxes to be lowered in order to help foreign investors who complained that they were unable to compete internationally because of such high duty. In 1996, officials from Binh Duong province accompanied representatives of a French electronics company, which had invested in the province, to Hanoi to lobby for changes in the law to allow the firm to import intermediate goods more cheaply. According to Binh Duong officials, the firm was paying the same amount in import taxes as the minimum price for which it could sell its finished product. The officials claim that in the end they got their way, with the relevant changes now enshrined in law. 34 One particularly notorious case of trade-related fence-breaking occurred in Long An province in the late 1990s. It was notable because it led to the dismissal of the provincial Communist Party secretary, Pham Thanh Phong, and the People's Committee chairman, Pham Van Thai, who were accused of turning a blind eye to smuggling. In their defence, the officials argued that they were simply trying to comply with the spirit of official legislation, which encouraged lowering tariffs as a way of promoting Vietnam's open-door policy. 35 The case highlights why it is not always easy to distinguish between innovation and corruption.
Some fence-breaking involving domestic trade was of a distinctly protectionist nature, with provinces moving to block imports from their neighbours or insisting that investors use locally produced goods in the production process. Such practices appear to be most common in poor coastal provinces in the north. 36 In the late 1990s, restaurants in Quang Binh province found it difficult to get permission to sell Hasinger beer, which is made in Ha Tinh province. There have also been reports of 'unwritten rules' in northern coastal provinces requiring investors to commit to using locally produced cement if they want their project to be approved. 
Industrial or Export-processing Zones
A number of provinces, including Binh Duong, Dong Nai and Ho Chi Minh City, pushed for the right to create industrial or exportprocessing zones to concentrate investment from the early 1990s. Dong Nai argued-somewhat ironically-that it should be allowed to establish the first industrial zone given its experience at managing an industrial zone in the former southern regime prior to 1975. With some reluctance, it is suggested, Hanoi allowed Dong Nai to proceed on an experimental basis in 1992.
37 Later in the decade, establishing industrial zones became all the rage and many provinces asked, and were granted, permission to create them. Some provinces, which were slow to receive official permission, have begun to create 'industrial concentrations' (cum cong nghiep) that offer the same infrastructure and other benefits to investors as industrial zones, but do not have the prime ministerial approval. In 2000, a number of provinces were pushing to expand the powers granted to them within industrial zones, asking that they should be given permission to guarantee loans to private firms wishing to establish businesses inside the zone. Having looked at the material generated by the content analysis in general terms, we will now look at the results overall.
Results of the Content Analysis
Based on the content analysis, the number of autonomous incidents was quite low at the beginning of the 1990s. They rose sharply in 1993 and 1994 reaching the highest level for the decade as a whole during these two years. In 1995, the number of autonomous incidents declined sharply although it was on a rising trend from 1997 (Fig. 1) .
In terms of policy area, fence-breaking was most common in the area of land policy, with 22 per cent of all recorded incidents occurring in this area. The next most common area in which fencebreaking occurred was micro-economic reform, with 18 per cent of recorded incidents. This was followed by legal reform (13 per cent), administrative policy (11 per cent) and trade policy (9 per cent) (Fig. 2) .
If we break recordings of autonomous incidents down in term of type of citation (i.e., being reported for engaging in fence-breaking, being punished for fence-breaking, requesting permission to experi- Figure 3 . Degree of autonomous actions ment, or being granted permission to experiment), the most common was being reported for engaging in fence-breaking. This accounted for very nearly half of all recorded cases. Requests by provincial authorities to be allowed to conduct policy experiments were the next most common form of fence-breaking recorded, accounting for 35.3 per cent of all incidents recorded. Reports of provinces being granted permission to experiment or officials being punished for fence-breaking appeared much less frequently. These two categories accounted for just 9.7 per cent and 6.0 per cent of autonomous incidents respectively (Fig. 3) .
In terms of the geographical location of autonomous actions, most of the early fence-breaking activities took place in southern provinces, especially in Ho Chi Minh City and the provinces around it, notably Ba Ria-Vung Tau, Binh Duong, Dong Nai, and Ho Chi Minh City. In official terminology, this is referred to as Vietnam's North Southeast region. Ho Chi Minh City itself is responsible for nearly onefourth of all cases of autonomous activity cited in the newspapers surveyed. Southern provinces were more autonomous than northern provinces between 1992 and 1996. However, by 1998, both halves of the country were acting autonomously at about the same rate while some northern provinces were more active fence-breakers than notorious southern ones. A good example is northern Vinh Phuc province which between 1997 and 2000 was cited for more autonomous actions Table 1 . Cumulative number of content analysis hits (By region and over time) REGION 1990 REGION 1991 REGION 1992 REGION 1993 REGION 1994 REGION 1995 REGION 1996 REGION 1997 REGION 1998 REGION 1999 
Testing Explanations for Provincial Autonomy
The Southern Legacy
One of the common assertions made in the literature on Vietnam is that provinces located in the former South Vietnamese regime are more likely to be fence-breakers in the reform era (the so-called southern legacy). Based on the data presented in this article (Fig. 4) , we can see that although many southern provinces were among the early fence-breakers, the southern legacy was not a determinative condition for early fence-breaking activity. Some provinces which were situated in the former southern regime have engaged in very 
Relations with Central Government
Using government data on cabinet representation by province and region, we find that those provinces which score most highly in terms of our measure for autonomy are least represented in government. 39 Thus, in the past three administrations covering the period from 1992-2002, only 11.9 per cent of cabinet ministers came from the South (Figs. 5 and 6 ). Most cabinet ministers came from the north Figure 5 . Distribution of cabinet by region and province or the centre of the country. Nghe An, Ha Tinh and Thanh Hoa were particularly highly represented. However, they are among the weakest fence-breakers in our sample. Furthermore, analysing the extent of cabinet representation of leading northern fence-breakers, we find that like their southern counterparts, they too are poorly represented in government. Vinh Phuc province, for example, currently has no cabinet representation while only one official from the province served in the cabinet in the early 1990s.
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Based on this data, it is clearly difficult to argue as many scholars have sought to do that fence-breaking provinces have been successful because they are well represented at the centre. Furthermore, one can go a step further and posit that the tendency of officials from fencebreaking provinces to stay at home may itself be linked to autonomy. However, whether it is a cause or a symptom, it is harder to say. 
Initial Conditions
Measuring the impact of initial conditions on provincial autonomy is not easy because of the lack of ready-made index for this variable which can be applied consistently across Vietnam's 61 provinces. To generate such an index, I took six factors commonly regarded as impediments to economic development. These were: the percentage of provincial GDP contributed by agriculture; the number of telephones per 1000 people; the percentage of population living in rural areas; the percentage of communes with roads to the provincial capital; the amount of transported material; and the distance of the province from the major economic centre of Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City.
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There are a number of problems with creating an initial conditions index in this way. However, many of the problems with the data can be adjusted for and none undermine the process entirely.
43 Calculating the mean provincial score for each of the six indicators created an initial conditions score ranging from nominally 'perfect' initial conditions for Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City to 'superior' for Hai Phong and Ba Ria-Vung Tau down to 'low' for Son La and Bac Kan ( Table 2) . GDP (1995 GDP ( ) people (1991 people (1991) capital (1995) per kilometer (1991) GDP (1995 GDP ( ) people (1991 people (1991) capital (1995) per kilometer (1991) or Ha Relating this data to provincial autonomy, moving up from 'low' to 'superior' initial conditions generally enhances the probability of autonomous activity. In addition, provinces with the lowest level of initial conditions saw almost no increase in autonomy over the course of the 1990s (Fig. 7) .
However, as with the southern legacy, the impact of initial conditions on provincial autonomy is by no means determinative. For example, provinces with 'very high' initial conditions actually recorded more cases of fence-breaking than those with 'superior' conditions. There was also very little difference in terms of the extent of fencebreaking between provinces in the 'medium-low' to 'high' initial conditions range.
While initial conditions appear not to be determinative, there are other problems with the initial conditions hypothesis as commonly articulated. Good initial conditions, such as well-developed infrastructure, cannot themselves lead to autonomous actions. Rather, they are only a first step towards enabling experimentation to occur. This presupposes another question, namely what is the causal mechanism by which initial conditions lead to more autonomy?
In this article, we consider a number of possible answers although focus on one in particular. It may be that provincial leaders in better endowed provinces more readily sense the opportunities that economic reform can bring, and act accordingly. Alternatively, good initial conditions may expose provincial leaders to innovative, external ideas because of the tendency that they attract a higher frequency of visits by foreign investors. Higher foreign-and domestic-investment may, in turn, lead to the emergence of a constituency which also advocates economic policy change.
A related possibility to the investment hypothesis above is that there may be a correlation between the dominant source of economic activity-whether it is central state, local state, private, or foreignand provincial autonomy. The argument here would be that different sources of economic activity would prompt different policy responses, including more or less fence-breaking. This is the explanation which is favoured here and is explored below. The Source of Economic Activity Table 3 classifies provinces according to whether their main source of revenue came from state, private or foreign companies in 2001-as a measure of the dominant source of economic activity. 44 Provinces are also divided according to a number of sub-categories. If a province is predominately reliant on revenue from central state-owned enterprises but is also a large recipient of FDI, it is shaded in the table. Provinces are also shaded if the largest source of revenue comes from the private sector but where revenue from the central and local state combined exceeds that of the private sector. A final category lists provinces where the largest source of revenue was formerly from the foreign-invested sector but where since 2000 it has been eclipsed by revenue from the domestic private sector, possibly as a result of new business registrations caused by passage of the enterprise law. Table 3 also lists the total incidence of autonomous activity for each province generated by the content analysis, enabling a comparison between autonomy and this variable to be made. provinces of all are those dominated by the local state sector. These are also provinces with difficult initial conditions, pointing to a possible conflation of these two causal factors.
Conclusion
Using the measure for provincial autonomy generated by the content analysis, this article has sought to test four key hypotheses for explaining provincial autonomy. The only hypothesis where there was no clear-cut evidence for increased autonomy is the one which suggests that provinces with close connections to the central government are likely to be more autonomous. Based on the data presented in this article, this proved to be untrue. However, it is possible that a different method of data collection could yield a different result. After all, provinces which have good relations with the centre may never be cited in the newspapers at all. Of the other three hypotheses-North-South differences, initial conditions and the dominant source of economic activity-a relationship with provincial autonomy was found in each case. However, it was never determinative. Consequently, a significant part of the data is left unexplained by the hypotheses considered here.
In some respects, this is not very surprising. After all, it is unlikely that any one hypothesis would explain everything. Instead, it is more likely that geographical location, initial conditions and the dominant source of economic activity probably interact in a complex manner, creating a variety of different opportunities for provincial autonomy. Table 4 represents a preliminary attempt to show how these variables may interact in a way which makes most sense of the data. Six types of province are identified. In the first category are southern provinces with high initial conditions which were able to attract high levels of FDI quickly. They tended to be the early fence-breakers in the early 1990s. A second group followed, which had lower initial conditions but benefited from proximity to these provinces as investment spilled over when land and labour costs in these provinces rose. A third group of vacillating provinces had high initial conditions, but tended to see most FDI enter in the form of joint ventures with state enterprises. This led policy makers to fluctuate between autonomous behaviour and behaviour beneficial to the state sector. Other provinces with low initial conditions tended to rely heavily on the sector which grew fastest in the early 1990s. Those provinces which remained captured by local state-owned companies constitute the fourth category, while a fifth category comprises those which responded to the emergence of the private sector. Neither type, however, showed much inclination towards autonomy. Finally, some provinces in both north and south Vietnam remained burdened by very 
